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REFLAGGING KUWAITI TANKERS: A U.S.
RESPONSE IN THE PERSIAN GULF
Since September 1986, Iranian air attacks on Persian Gulf shipping
have focused on Kuwaiti vessels and vessels bound for Kuwaiti ports.
Iran singled out Kuwait partially in retaliation for the aid Kuwait has
given to Iraq during the course of the eight-year war between Iran and
Iraq.' In response to escalating attacks on its shipping, Kuwait sought
assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union in protecting its
vessels and maritime commerce.2 In March 1987, the United States re-
sponded by reflagging eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers as United States
vessels.3
Reflagging the tankers changed the nationality of the vessels from
Kuwaiti to U.S., entitling the tankers to United States naval protection.
As of the writing of this note, all eleven reflagged tankers are transiting
the Persian Gulf escorted by United States warships.4 Although the con-
voys have not been challenged or attacked directly,5 two of the vessels
have encountered the major risks the Iran-Iraq War poses to commercial
shipping in the Gulf-mines and air attacks.6
Large numbers of mines appeared in the Persian Gulf about the time
the United States began its convoys of the reflagged tankers.7 That Iran
was responsible, at least partially, was finally proven when United States
special forces on naval helicopters located, photographed, then attacked
an Iranian vessel unloading mines into an international shipping lane in
1. See DEFENSE POLICY PANEL & THE INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON ARMED SERVICES, 100TH CONG., IST SESS., NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
UNITED STATES OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF 7-9 (Comm. Print 1987). The report also
cited other reasons why Iran singled out Kuwait: (1) Kuwait is small and easily pressured; and (2)
Kuwait is less willing to cooperate with Tehran on issues of oil policy. Id. at 8-9.
2. See 133 CONG. REc. E2646-47 (daily ed. June 26, 1987) (statement of Rep. Aspin).
3. C. Weinberger, A Report to the Congress on Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf, at
ii (June 15, 1987).
4. Convoy to a Minefield, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 3, 1987, at 20-21.
5. In the Gulf, Nowhere to Hide, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1987, at 44.
6. On July 24, 1987, the reflagged Kuwaiti tanker Bridgeton struck a mine 120 miles southeast
of Kuwait on its maiden voyage under the U.S. flag. See Convoy to a Minefield, supra note 4, at 20-
21. On October 15, 1987, the U.S.-flagged Sea Isle City was hit by an Iranian-fired Silkworm missile
while in Kuwait's territorial waters, unescorted by U.S. warships. United States Reprisal Against
Iran, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRE. Doc. 1206 (Oct. 20, 1987). For a discussion of the legal implica-
tions of Iranian and Iraqi air attacks on merchant shipping, see Note, Air Attacks on Neutral Ship-
ping in the Persian Gulf: The Legality of the Iraqi Exclusion Zone and Iranian Reprisals, 8 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 517 (1985).
7. The Mines ofAugust, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1987, at 22.
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the Gulf. An examination of the mines on board the Iranian vessel dis-
closed that the mines were similar to others previously discovered
throughout the Gulf.8
This note first examines the legality of the Kuwaiti tanker reflagging
under international and domestic standards. The discussion traces the
development of the international standard-the "genuine link"9-for
reflagging and the domestic implementation of the international require-
ments for reflagging. The note then analyzes the validity of the reflag-
ging under both standards and suggests that the vagueness of the genuine
link language in international conventions permits nations to employ
reflagging to suit their own objectives as long as the implementation
meets certain minimum standards.10 The United States has taken full
advantage of the vagueness of the genuine link requirement, using the
reflagged vessels to achieve broader political objectives in the Persian
Gulf. Nevertheless, to the extent that the genuine link requirement con-
notes some degree of flag state control over the administrative, technical,
and social matters of a vessel, the reflagging satisfies the minimum stan-
dards of international maritime law.
The note next examines the state practice implications of the reflag-
ged tankers' movement under convoy through the Gulf. When states act
contrary to international law standards, states whose interests are
harmed by the violation are entitled to seek a resolution through peaceful
means and, if necessary, to protect their interests.' Efforts to seek a
peaceful end to the Iran-Iraq War through United Nations Security
Council resolutions have failed.1 2 In the meantime, the United States
8. Caught in the Act, TIME, Oct. 5, 1987, at 20-22.
9. "Genuine link" is a term used in international and maritime law to describe the contacts
linking a vessel to the state whose flag it flies. The term "genuine link" originally arose in the
context of determining the nationality of a person. Nottebohm Case (Licht. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4,
23. The transfer of the idea to the maritime area was suggested by the Netherlands Government in
1956 and later adopted by the International Law Commission in its draft articles on the regime of
the high seas that eventually became the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. See Summary Records
of the 341st Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 36, 37-38, U.N. Doc. A/2934/1956 A/CN.4/
97 & Add. 1, A/CN.4/99 & Add. 1-5; Regime of the High Seas and Regime of the Territorial Sea,
[1956] 2 Y.B. IVrr'L L. COMM'N 1, 62-63, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/99/Add.1.
10. See infra notes 59-90 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
12. The United Nations Security Council passed a unanimous resolution on July 20, 1987,
calling for an immediate ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War. U.N.S.C. Res. 598 (1987), reprinted in
Iran-Iraq War and Navigation in the Gulf[May 17-August 11, 1987], 26 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1422, 1479-80 (1987). Iran responded to the resolution saying in part, "Resolution 598 (1987) has
been formulated and adopted by the United States with the explicit intention of intervention in the
Persian Gulf and the region, mustering support for Iraq and its supporters in the war." Letter dated
August 11, 1987 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/19031, Aug. 11, 1987, reprinted in Iran-
Iraq War and Navigation in the Gulf supra, at 1481. The Iranian response noted that the Security
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and allies have increased the number of naval forces in the Gulf.13 The
forces serve two purposes: first, the more immediate purpose of protect-
ing shipping and second, the more important purpose of visible protest.
The Persian Gulf maneuvers establish a state practice precedent of coop-
erative efforts to protect the freedom of navigation and deter illegal acti-
vities impeding that freedom.
The note analyzes the United States' response to the mining of Per-
sian Gulf waters. When minesweeping activity can deactivate mines,
states should seek that avenue of resolution. When evidence of mining is
so clear as to leave no opportunity for a negotiated cessation of mining
activities, those threatened by mines should take action to prevent fur-
ther unlawful sowing of mines. The United States did so when it at-
tacked an Iranian minelayer. In all cases in which there is clear evidence
of mining that has caused damage, states should press claims for com-
pensation against the perpetrator.
This note concludes that, apart from whatever more immediate and
debatable foreign policy ends the reflagging serves, the movement of the
United States convoys in the Persian Gulf serves the important function
under international law of effective state protest against illegal Iranian
and Iraqi actions.14 The presence of neutral vessels trading in the Gulf
manifests the intent of "neutral states to protect and enforce customary
rights of trading and free navigation. Without effective protest against
actions clearly unjustifiable under international law, the danger exists
that the illegal practices will become precedents, moving state practice
further from the pacifistic goals of the United Nations Charter.15
Council did not act when Iran was attacked by Iraq and that by passing the resolution, the Security
Council was acting at the behest of the United States, turning it into a party to the conflict. Letter
dated Aug. 11, 1987, reprinted in Iran-Iraq War and Navigation in the Gulf, supra, at 1482. The
letter concluded by commending the Secretary-General on his independent initiatives, expressing the
desire to continue cooperating with him. Id at 1484. The Iraqi Government responded that it
welcomed the resolution and was willing to cooperate in implementing a settlement with Iran. Let-
ter dated August 14, 1987 from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/19045, Aug. 14, 1987, reprinted in
Iran-Iraq War and Navigation in the Gulf[May 17-August 11, 1987] 26 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1422, 1485 (1987).
13. The United States has maintained some naval forces in the Persian Gulf since 1949. The
size of its naval presence in the Gulf increased dramatically when the United States agreed to reflag
and escort the Kuwaiti tankers. The incremental increase in cost of operations in and around the
Gulf arising from the increased presence was estimated to be $69 million for July through Septem-
ber, 1987. R. O'RoURKE, PERSIAN GULF: U.S. MILITARY OPERATiONS 4-7 (Congressional Re-
search Serv. No. 1B87145, 1987).
14. See infra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
15. The text of the United Nations Charter can be found at 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993.
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I. THE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR REFLAGGING
The flag of a vessel serves two different functions: it is a symbol of
the nationality of the ship, consequently designating the national law that
governs the affairs of the vessel, and it identifies the location of those
responsible for the vessel. 16 Although liability for the vessel's actions
and affairs rests with the owner, responsibility for ensuring that the vessel
meets certain international standards rests with the nation granting the
vessel its flag. 17
Some states offer vessel registration under conditions that impose
fewer financial and administrative burdens than are imposed by other
states. Thus, economic, rather than political considerations usually ac-
count for an owner's decision to flag or reflag a vessel under a particular
state's flag.' 8 The considerations behind the Kuwaiti request to reflag
eleven of its tankers and the United States' response in granting that re-
quest were, however, quite the opposite. The Kuwaiti request arose from
the immediate political and strategic concern of thwarting further Ira-
nian attacks on its vessels. Given the exigencies of the situation, this
reflagging represents "an unusual measure to meet an extraordinary situ-
ation," 19 not a typical flagging transaction.
Regardless of the United States' motives, the reflagging must be jus-
tifiable on its own merits as a reflagging under the international and do-
mestic standards that govern vessel registration.20 The international
standard is embodied in the concept of the genuine link that was ad-
dressed in three separate conventions.21 The United States has accepted
one of those conventions and implemented its requirements in large part
in the Vessel Documentation Act.22
16. N. SINGH, MARITIME FLAG AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1978).
17. See infra notes 23-54 and accompanying text.
18. See B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY 26-36
(1962) (discussing the economic advantages offered by the "Panlibhon" states--Panama, Liberia,
and Honduras); Comment, Vessel Registration in Selected Open Registries, 6 MAR. LAw. 221, 222-
25 (1981).
19. UNITED STATES DEP'T OP STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 958, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING
AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 2 (1987).
20. The Reagan administration has based the propriety of its increased presence in the Persian
Gulf in part on the well-accepted principle that states are entitled to protect vessels flying their flag.
The first step in analyzing the event is to determine whether the United States properly attributed its
flag to the tankers.
21. The first was the Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter 1958 Convention]; the second was the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, A/
CONF.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS]; and the third was United Nations: Convention on
Conditions for Registration of Ships, art. 9, para. 1 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Convention].
22. Pub. L. No. 96-594, 94 Stat. 3453 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 46
U.S.C.).
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A. International Standards for Reflagging: The Genuine Link
What constitutes a sufficiently genuine link between vessel and state
under international law has been the source of continued controversy
since the genuine link concept's incorporation into maritime law in
1958.23 Three conventions have addressed the issue of vessel national-
ity24 and, although all three require that a genuine link exist as a condi-
tion to flagging a vessel, none have specifically defined its content. This
section traces the development of the genuine link in order to assess the
reflagging action both under the specific standard applicable to the
United States by virtue of its acceptance of the first convention25 and
under the current trend of world opinion as embodied in the latest
convention.2 6
1. The 1958 Convention on the High Seas. The genuine link con-
cept was first officially applied to vessels and codified in the First United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea's 1958 Convention on the
High Seas (1958 Convention). 27 The debate over the conditions under
which a state could flag vessels as its own had become increasingly divi-
sive after World War 1,28 separating the traditional maritime powers
from those developing countries that allowed vessels to fly their national
flag without imposing strict requirements on vessel owners.2 9 The ad-
ministrative and economic convenience of registering vessels under these
less burdensome regimes led to the use of the term "flag of convenience"
.to denote these states.30 The 1958 Convention intended to redress the
perceived problems caused by flag of convenience regimes.
23. See Tache, The Nationality of Ships: The Definitional Controversy and Enforcement of Gen-
uine Link. 16 INT'L LAW. 301, 301 (1982).
24. See supra note 21.
25. The United States signed and ratified the first convention discussing the genuine link, the
1958 Convention on the High Seas, on April 12, 1961. 1958 Convention, supra note 21.
26. 1986 Convention, supra note 21.
27. 1958 Convention, supra note 21.
28. McConnell, " . . Darkening Confusion Mounted Upon Darkening Confusion':" The Search
for the Elusive Genuine Link, 16 J. MAR. L. & COM. 365, 370-78 (1985).
29. Id. at 373.
30. B. BOCZEK, supra note 18, at 2 ("Functionally, a 'flag of convenience' can be defined as the
flag of any country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled vessels under
conditions that for whatever the reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who are
registering the vessels.") The "flight" of vessels from their registry to the flag of convenience states
continues to pose substantial concern for the traditional maritime states because it removes substan-
tial numbers of vessels and, consequently, revenues and wartime bottom capacity, from the reach of
the traditional maritime states. Vessel owners from the traditional maritime states often prefer to
use the flag of convenience registries because of the relatively simpler and less expensive registry
processes, tax breaks, and cheaper labor. Id at 26-63. See also FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON MERCHANT MARINE AND DEFENSE: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 30 (Sept. 30,
1987); Comment, supra note 18, at 221-25.
REFLAGGING
During the negotiations in the 1958 Convention, the established
maritime states together with international seafarer groups sought strict
vessel registration requirements-a "genuine link" between vessels and
the state of registration.31 Two major concerns motivated the push to
codify a strict genuine link requirement. First, the maritime states saw
the genuine link as a means of imposing substantive burdens on all flag-
ging states, thus reducing the convenience and economy of flag of con-
venience regimes and lessening their competitive threat.3 2 Second,
various groups felt that stricter supervision of vessel conditions by the
registering state would eliminate substandard vessels detrimentally af-
fecting labor, safety, and environmental conditions at sea.33 The flag of
convenience nations resisted the restrictions, claiming that strict require-
ments infringed upon a state's sovereign right to grant its flag at its own
discretion.3 4
The compromise that resulted required: (1) that "[e]ach State shall
fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registra-
tion... and for the right to fly its flag;"' 35 (2) that a genuine link must
exist; and (3) "in particular, [that] the State must effectively exercise its
jurisdiction and control in the administrative, technical and social mat-
ters over ships flying its flag."' 36 The language of the 1958 Convention,
by joining the genuine link and the required exercise of effective jurisdic-
tion and control, at least implied that fulfillment of the latter alone would
satisfy the genuine link requirement. 37 It left, however, the determina-
tion of the details to the discretion of each state, requiring only that the
31. See McConnell, supra note 28, at 368-70.
32. See LAW OF THE SEA CONVENI-ONS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 5, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. - (1960),
reprinted in 106 CONG. REc. 11,189, 11,190 (1960) [hereinafter ExEcuTivE REPORT] ("Some
States, which felt their flag vessels were at a competitive disadvantage with vessels sailing under the
flags of other States, such as Panama and Liberia, were anxious to adopt a definition which States
like Panama and Liberia could not meet."); B. BOCZEK, supra note 18, at 81-86; McConnell, supra
note 28, at 364-70.
33. See McConnell, supra note 28, at 369-70.
34. B. BOCZEK, supra note 18, at 256-59.
35. 1958 Convention, supra note 21, art. 5, para. 1.
36. Article 5 provides in full:
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the national-
ity of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between
the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and
control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
2. Each State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents
to that effect.
Id
37. See Burke, Changes Made in the Rules of Navigation and Maritime Trade by the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1986 LAw OF THE SEA INSTrrUTE WORKsHOP 662, 663 (1986).
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registering states establish the conditions necessary for flagging and exer-
cise effective jurisdiction and control once the flagging was completed.
The United States supported the flag of convenience states' efforts to
define the genuine link requirement as broadly and with as few concrete
requirements as possible.38 This remains the United States' position. At
the time of the 1958 Convention, the United States was, and still is, a
participant in flag of convenience regimes.39 Both the United States and
the flag of convenience states eventually agreed to the convention because
the indeterminate language permitted them to maintain their registration
systems without much change.4°
2. The 1982 Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea. The vagueness of the terms and uncertainty about application of
the 1958 Convention did little to control the trend toward flag of conven-
ience registry: use of the flag of convenience registries has increased by
one-third since 1958.41 The next opportunity to address the flagging is-
sue on a worldwide basis came at the Third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).42 Between the conclusion of the First'
Convention in 1958 and the commencement of the Third Convention in
1973, worldwide support for external control of vessels further coalesced
at the prompting of labor movements and environmentalists who gener-
ally regarded flag of convenience vessels as substandard and therefore
dangerous to their crews and the environment. 43
The 1982 UNCLOS provisions moved away from suggesting a di-
rect relationship between the genuine link and effective forms of jurisdic-
tion and control. The article concerning the grant of nationality to a ship
required only the existence of a genuine link, although again without de-
fining its content.44 Further duties of the registering state were not con-
nected with the genuine link requirement but instead were moved to a
38. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 18, at 248, 256, 273, 285.
39. Id. at 285.
40. Id. at 259.
41. Burke, supra note 37, at 663-64.
42. UNCLOS, supra note 21.
43. McConnell, supra note 28, at 378-79; N. SINGH, supra note 16, at 8-13; Note, Promulgation
and Enforcement of Minimum Standards for Foreign Flag Ships, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 54, 54 n.1
(1980).
44. Article 91, entitled "Nationality of Ships," provides:
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the national-
ity of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between
the State and the ship.
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag
documents to that effect.
UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 91.
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separate article.4 5 The separate article contained an expanded list of du-
ties the registering state had to undertake to ensure that vessels met cer-
tain international standards set out in other, more specialized con-
ventions.46 Although the provision obligated the state to fulfill more
comprehensive tasks than did the 1958 Convention, UNCLOS nonethe-
less failed to include, due to disagreement, the specific details of the genu-
ine link that would have required mandatory national ownership and
crew. The move reflected the shift from an emphasis on the role of the
state to an emphasis on the quality of the vessel, thereby avoiding the
difficult question of interfering in matters traditionally under the sole
control of a state while at the same time addressing the problem of sub-
standard vessels.47
3. The 1986 United Nations Conference on Conditions for Registra-
tion of Ships. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's
(UNCTAD's) studies and resolutions noting the deleterious effects of flag
of convenience registries on international shipping resulted in a conven-
tion in 1986 to establish conditions for the registration of vessels.48 In
particular, a 1977 report by the UNCTAD Secretariat reported that most
45. Id. art. 94 (entitled "Duties of the Flag State").
46. Article 94 lists the measures states must undertake to ensure that vessels are properly regis-
tered, manned and inspected. In addition, it permits states to report substandard vessels to the flag
state, which then has a duty to investigate the vessel and take whatever remedial action is necessary.
Id. art. 94, para. 5.
47. See McConnell, supra note 28, at 382-83 ("The shift in the strategy of the traditional mari-
time states and organized labour from direct regulation of registration in the 1950s, which proved
politically and legally unacceptable, to indirect regulation through international standards may have
succeeded in its objective [of eliminating the open registry system or some of their commercial
advantages].").
48. 1986 Convention, supra note 21; see, eg., Resolution Adopted by the Committee on Shipping
at its Third Special Session, Res. 43 (S-I1) (Open Registry Fleets) at 2, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.34/2
Annex I (1982) (resolution in Annex I calling for: (1) a gradual conversion of open registries into
normal registries by a process of tightening conditions of registration so that registering countries
will be able to identify the owners of the vessels and make them accountable; and (2) convening a
new conference). One committee report noted that "[i]n the economic context, the question which
called for consideration was whether a country could properly be regarded as having a genuine link
if it did not have an equitable participation in the benefits accruing from the operation of vescels [sic]
registered under its flag." U.N. Conf on Trade & Dev.: Report of the Ad Hoe Intergovernmental
Working Group on the Economic Consequences of the Existence or Lack of a Genuine Link Between
Vessel and Flag of Registry, 9 UNCTAD C. at 4, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/177 (1978). The resolution
accompanying the report concluded that "[t]he expansion of open-registry fleets has adversely af-
fected the development and competitiveness of fleets of countries which do not offer open-registry
facilities, including those of developing countries." U.N. Conf on Trade & Dev.: Resolution Adopted
by the Ad Hoe Intergovernmental Working Group at Its Fifth (Closing) Meeting on 10 February
1978, 9 UNCTAD C. 4 Annex at 1, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/AC.1/3 (1978). The resolution went on
to state that "[t]he following elements are normally relevant when establishing whether a genuine
link exists between a vessel and its country of registry: (i) the merchant fleet contributes to the
national economy of the country; (ii) revenues and expenditures of shipping, as well as purchases and
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governments acceded that the genuine link standard incorporated several
distinct, though uncodified, requirements, including national ownership,
manning and management! 9 The 1986 Convention sought to define
these missing qualities of the genuine link and to establish "the key eco-
nomic links between a ship and the flag state that are often missing in
practice."50
By specifying the percentages of the owners, crews and management
that must be nationals of the flag state,5 1 the 1986 Convention went
much further toward achieving a national and an economic link between
the vessel and its state than either of its predecessor conventions. Close
inspection of the language, 52 however, indicates that the vague wording
in the crucial articles covering manning, ownership and management,
and allowances for compliance according to domestic law rather than
international law, leaves sufficient flexibility in the provisions to accom-
modate the current practices of the flag of convenience states.5 3 An even
more basic deficiency in UNCTAD's attempt to achieve uniformity in
vessel standards is the convention's preamble's recognition of the contin-
ued right of each state, ultimately, to establish its own conditions for the
granting of its flag.54
B. Domestic Standards for Reflagging.
Because the United States is not a party to either UNCLOS or the
sales of vessels, are treated in the national balance-of-payments accounts; (iii) the employment of
nationals on vessels; [and] (iv) the beneficial ownership of the vessel .... " Id.
49. Economic Consequences of the Existence or Lack of a Genuine Link Between Vessel and Flag
ofRegistry: Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 8 UNCTAD C. 4 Corr. at 9-11, U.N. Doc. TD/B/
C.4/168/Corr.1 (1977). The genuine link was generally considered to involve a combination of
factors: (1) the fact of registration; (2) a substantial share of beneficial ownership by nationals of the
registering state; (3) the principal place of business of the beneficial owners in the registering state;
(4) the principal officers of the owning entity should be nationals of the registering state; and (5)
national legislation and administering bodies to implement legislation controlling the administrative,
social, technical, safety, and environmental matters of the vessels. Id. at 20-21.
50. UNCTAD INFORMATION UNIT, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONDITIONS FOR
REGISTRATION OF SHis ADOPTED at I, U.N. Doc. TAD/INF/1770 (1986).
51. 1986 Convention, supra note 21, arts. 9-11.
52. For discussions of the convention provisions, see Marston, The UN Convention on Registra-
tion ofShips, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 575 (1986); McConnell, "Business as Usual':" An Evaluation
of the 1986 United Nations Convention Conditionsfor Registration of Ships, 18 . MAR. L. & COM.
435 (1987); Sturmey, The United Nations Convention on Conditionsfor Registration ofShips, 1987
LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 97.
53. McConnell, supra note 52, at 449.
54. The Preamble provides, "Reaffirming, without prejudice to this Convention, that each State
shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its
territory and for the right to fly its flag." 1986 Convention, supra note 21, preamble.
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1986 Convention on the Conditions for the Registration of Ships,55 the
1958 Convention standards apply to the United States' reflagging of the
Kuwaiti tankers.5 6 Title 46, chapter 121 of the United States Code, gov-
erning the documentation of vessels, codifies the domestic implementa-
tion of the 1958 Convention.5 7 The Code requires that the tankers be:
(1) properly constructed and inspected by the United States Coast
Guard, (2) manned by the appropriate number of United States crew and
officers, and (3) documented as belonging to a United States citizen.58
II. ANALYSIS OF THE R.EFLAGGING
A. Meeting the Technical Requirements.
The United States' reflagging effort was criticized almost immedi-
ately as transparent, conveying "'temporary' cellophane flags for exten-
sion of the use of force."' 59 The State Department Legal Adviser
responded to such criticism by arguing that the application of American
statutory procedures constituted a sufficient genuine link to fulfill the re-
quirements of the 1958 Convention. 6° He noted that the vessels comply
with the vessel documentation laws of the United States, are subject to
United States laws and jurisdiction, meet United States requirements for
ownership, manning, and safety, are subject to United States tax and cor-
poration laws, and are available to the government for the Military
Sealift Command. 61
55. For the United States' decision not to sign UNCLOS, see 2 PUB. PAPERS 911-12 (1982).
For a discussion of the Reagan administration's position, see Malone, Who Needs the Sea Treaty?, 54
FOREIGN PoL'y 44 (1984). For a general discussion of the background of the decision not to sign,
see Larson, The Reagan Rejection of the U.N. Convention, 14 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 337 (1985).
As of August 31, 1987, the United States had not signed the 1986 Convention on Conditions for
Registration of Ships. See 1986 Convention, supra note 21.
56. Sofaer, Complied With U.S. Law, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1987, at E24, col. 5 (letter to editor
from State Department's Legal Adviser). The United States accepted the 1958 Convention on the
Iigh Seas on April 12, 1961. 1958 Convention, supra note 21.
57. See 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 12,101-12,122 (West Supp. 1988). For general descriptions of the re-
codified United States vessel documentation laws see Drzal & Camilla, Documentation of Vessel-
The Fog Lifts, 13 . MAR. L. & COM. 261 (1982); Comment, The Vessel Documentation Act of 1980,
7 MAR. LAW. 303 (1982).
58. STAFF OF HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, 100TH CONG.,
IST SESS., MEMORANDUM ON REFLAGGING OF KUWArI TANKERS [hereinafter MEMORANDUM
ON REFLAGGING], reprinted in Oversight on the Reflagging of Kuwaiti Tankers: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries; 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 124, 126 (1987) [hereinafter
Hearings] (executive summary of Requirements, Processes and Actions in Kuwaiti Reflagging).
59. Paust, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1987, at E26, col. 3.
60. Sofaer, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1987, at E24, col. 5.
61. Id.
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1. Meeting the International Standard. Under a literal interpre-
tation of the three conventions' requirements, the reflagging meets the
standards set forth. Although the United States is not a party to the
1986 Convention, current United States vessel documentation require-
ments would qualify under 1986 standards because the critical provisions
permit each state to implement the 1986 Convention according to its own
law.62 The reflagging meets the ownership 63 and management provi-
sions, 64 but does not meet the national crew requirement. 65 Under the
terms of the 1986 Convention, however, it need only meet the ownership
or manning requirements, not both.66
The United States reflagging also meets the 1958 Convention crite-
ria because the United States has established the conditions necessary for
the registration of vessels under its domestic law. The United States has
the authority to regulate the administrative, technical and social matters
of the vessels, and it exercises effective jurisdiction and control over the
vessels. 67 As nothing more is literally required by the language of the
62. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
63. Article 8, paragraph 2 provides that the flag state, in its laws and regulations,
shall include appropriate provisions for participation by that State or its nationals as own-
ers of ships flying its flag or in the ownership of such ships and for the level of such partici-
pation. These laws and regulations should be sufficient to permit the flag State to exercise
effectively its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag.
1986 Convention, supra note 21, art. 8, para. 2.
Chesapeake Shipping, Inc. is, under the laws of the United States, a U.S. corporation and is
owner of the vessels. "Owner" is defined simply as the person on record as owning the vessel; the
article does not require equity ownership by nationals. Id art. 2. Thus, it would appear that Chesa-
peake Shipping, Inc., a wholly-owned Kuwaiti company, would qualify because it has met the re-
quirements of theflag state's laws for establishing ownership.
64. The 1986 Convention requires that, "before entering a ship in its register of ships, [the
registering State] shall ensure that the shipowning company or a subsidiary shipowning company is
established and/or has its principal place of business within its territory in accordance with its laws
and regulations." Id. art. 10.
Further, the ship's management persons are "duly empowered to act on the shipowner's behalf
and account," and are available for any legal process. Id art. 10, para. 2. The flag state must ensure
that the responsible managers of the vessels "are in a position to meet the financial obligations that
may arise from the operation of such a ship to cover risks which are normally insured in interna-
tional maritime transportation in respect of damage to third parties." Id
Chesapeake Shipping, Inc. satisfies the requirements because it has a subsidiary in the United
States and ensures that the company is subject to service of legal process in the United States.
65. Article 9 provides that a state of registration "shall observe the principle that a satisfactory
part of the complement consisting of officers and crew of ships flying its flag be nationals or persons
domiciled or lawfully in permanent residence in that State." Id art. 9.
As the master of each tanker is the only U.S. citizen in the crew, the reflagged tankers would
clearly fail this part of the test, because although the Convention provides no standard for "satisfac-
tory," leaving it to the flag state's discretion, no one could legitimately argue that only one of the
crew for a supertanker is a "satisfactory" number.
66. Article 7 allows signatories to the Convention to select to comply with either the ownership
or the manning provisions or both. Id. art. 7.
67. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
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1958 Convention in assuring that a genuine link exists, the link, ipso
facto, is established. To the extent that the 1958 Convention sought to
impose a certain public order on the oceans 68 by establishing a system to
locate those responsible for vessels and ensuring that all vessels meet cer-
tain community standards for safety, the Kuwaiti reflagging meets those
needs.
2. Meeting the Domestic Standards. The domestic procedures
applied to reflag the Kuwaiti tankers were based on preexisting policy
and practice. No new laws were written specifically for the occasion;
none were waived except by statutory authority; no extraordinary proce-
dures were used.69 Because the Kuwaiti tankers met all necessary statu-
tory requirements or conditions for waivers, the reflagging, under
domestic law, was technically proper.
The Coast Guard conducted the inspection in Kuwait. 70 As part of
the permissible inspection procedures, the Department of Defense re-
quested a one-year waiver from compliance with those United States re-
quirements that exceed requirements set by certain international safety
conventions.71 The Department of Defense request was premised on pre-
existing national security waivers provided in the Code.72
United States-flagged vessels normally must carry a full complement
of United States officers and at least 75% United States crew upon leav-
ing a United States port.73 If, however, a vessel is in a foreign port and is
68. N. SINGH, supra note 16, at 3.
69. MEMORANDUM ON REFLAGGING, supra note 58, at 5, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 58,
at 132 (view maintained by Coast Guard).
70. See id at i (Executive Summary), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 58, at 126; cf. UNrrED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADDITIONAL COSTS TO GOVERNMENT: REFLAGGING
KUWAITI SHIPS AND PROTECTING THEM IN THE PERSIAN GULF 2 (1987). The GAO report notes
that, in accordance with its usual procedures for performing overseas inspections, 46 U.S.C.A.
§ 3317(b) (West Supp. 1987), the Coast Guard billed the Kuwaiti shipping company the $19,000
necessary to complete the inspection. Id
71. MEMORANDUM ON REFLAGGING, supra note 58, at 5, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 58,
at 132. The Defense Department request is authorized by the Act of December 27, 1950, 46 U.S.C.
app. ch. 1 note (Supp. III 1985). The request waives compliance with those vessel inspection and
navigation laws that exceed the standards set by the following international conventions to which the
United States is a party: the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), opened
for signature June 17, 1960, 16 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27, opened for signature
Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 9700; the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
tion by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters (MARPOL), opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120; and the International Convention on Load
Lines, opened for signature Apr. 5, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857, T.I.A.S. No. 6331, 640 U.N.T.S. 133. The
waivers were requested for one year, except for the drydocking requirements, for which a two year
waiver was requested. MEMORANDUM ON REFLAGGING, supra note 58, at 5, reprinted in Hearings,
supra note 58, at 132.
72. Act of December 27, 1950, 46 U.S.C. app. ch. 1 note (Supp. III 1985).
73. 46 U.S.C. §§ 7102, 8103(a)-(b) (Supp. III 1985).
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deprived of her crew, alien replacements are sufficient until the vessel
returns to a United States port and can secure United States replace-
ments.74 This exemption does not apply to the master; the master com-
manding a United States vessel must always be a United States citizen.75
The United States Coast Guard, over the objection of several seamen's
groups, 76 considered the Kuwaiti tankers as falling within the ambit of
the exemption. 77 Because the Kuwaiti tankers are not departing from or
calling at a United States port, the 75% United States crew and 100%
United States officer requirements were deemed inapplicable.78 The
tankers are manned by non-U.S. citizens and U.S. masters; the Kuwaitis
agreed to replace the Soviet-bloc sailors on four of its tankers with Fili-
pino crew and European or Arab officers. 79
United States ownership requirements are satisfied if a vessel is
owned by a United States citizen or corporation.80 Corporate citizenship
requirements are satisfied if: (1) the corporation is incorp6rated under
the laws of the United States or any state thereof; (2) the president or
other chief executive officer and the chairman of the board of directors
are United States citizens; and (3) the number of foreign directors is less
than the number necessary to constitute a quorum.81 The reflagged tank-
ers are owned by the Delaware corporation, Chesapeake Shipping, Inc.,
which was formed under Delaware law on May 15, 1987.82 The corpora-
tion assumed ownership and operation of the eleven reflagged tankers,
previously owned by the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company; the corporation
then chartered the tankers back to the Kuwaiti company. 83 Because
74. Id. § 8103(e).
75. Id. §§ 8103(e), 7102, 8103(a).
76. Various maritime organizations representing seamen, masters and pilots, and radio officers
testified at the U.S. House of Representatives Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee's hearing
on the reflagging on June 18, 1987, objecting to the manning arrangements for the Kuwaiti vessels
that required only a U.S. master on the vessels rather than the usual 100% U.S. officer and 75% U.S.
crew arrangement. See Hearings, supra note 58, at 109-115, 118-23, 175-80, 227-31 (statement of
representatives of the Seafarers International Union of North America, International Organization
of Masters, Mates and Pilots, and AFL-CIO Maritime Committee/National Maritime Union).
77. See id. at 77 (statement of Rear Admiral John W. Kime, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Office of
Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection).
78. MEMORANDUM ON REFLAGGING, supra note 58, at 10, reprinted in Hearings, supra note
58, at 137.
79. Id.
80. 46 U.S.C.A. § 12,102(a) (West Supp. 1987).
81. Id. § 12,102(a)(4).
82. Hearings, supra note 58, at 104 (statement of Mark P. Schlefer, counsel to Chesapeake
Shipping, Inc.).
83. All of the issued and outstanding shares of Chesapeake Shipping, Inc. are owned by the
Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation,
which is owned by the Kuwait government. Delaware Firm'Is New Home of Kuwaiti Ships, Wash.
Post, July 5, 1987, at A21 [hereinafter Delaware Firm]. The President/Chief Executive Officer, the
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neither United States nor international law requires equity ownership,
Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., with its Delaware registration, American
president and chief executive officer, and a majority of United States citi-
zens on its board of directors, meets the domestic statutory requirements
for United States corporate ownership even though the corporation and
tankers are still essentially owned by the Kuwaiti government.
B. Meeting the Spirit of the Law.
Although the reflagging meets the technical requirements, whether
the reflagging meets the spirit of the genuine link requirement is another
matter. Although the United States is not bound by it, the 1986 Conven-
tion indicates a trend towards a good faith national link between vessels
and states.84 The reflagging does not meet this intention; there is very
little about the tankers that is American. Neither their true owners, their
management, nor their crew are by majority United States citizens.
The United States reflagging defeats the purposes of the 1986 Con-
vention inasmuch as the 1986 Convention seeks to reduce the oppor-
tunites for unilateral flagging decisions and to eliminate the perceived
unfairness of permissive links by imposing some degree of uniformity on
vessel registration. Although the 1986 Convention addressed itself to the
perceived abuses arising from flag of convenience practices, that does not
make the 1986 Convention any less applicable to politically expedient
reflaggings. It is expediency that the 1986 Convention intended to elimi-
nate by basing vessel registration on more solid ties.
The non-genuine character of the link arises from the transparent
manipulation of statutes designed to address the peculiarities of maritime
commerce to serve immediate political goals. The move may have been a
savvy political one, as it is based on the presumptive nature of the flag-
once attributed it cannot be questioned 85-but that does not make the
affair any less transparent.
Vice-President/Assistant Secretary, the Vice-President/Corporate Secretary and two more Assistant
Secretaries of Chesapeake Shipping, Inc. are United States citizens. The remainder of the officers of
the corporation include one Kuwaiti citizen, one United Kingdom citizen and one Jordanian citizen.
Hearings, supra note 58, at 104-05 (statement of Mark P. Schlefer, counsel to Chesepeake Shipping,
Inc.).
In May, when it became apparent that the vessels required a U.S. owner to qualify for registra-
tion, the officers of the Sante Fe International Corporation, a Kuwait Petroleum Corporation-owned
company, created Chesapeake Shipping, Inc. to take title to the 11 tankers. The company is repre-
sented by a registered agent in Delaware, its only place of business in the United States, and has
assets of $350 million, the value of the tankers. Delaware Firm, supra, at A21.
84. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
85. See M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1011-12 (2d ed.
1987); see also EXECuTrvE REPORT, supra note 32, at 11,190 (Senate ratified of the 1958 Law of the
Sea Convention with the understanding that only the flag state can question the national character of
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There was no legal impediment to escorting and protecting the tank-
ers while they were flying the Kuwaiti flag. 86 The United States could
have worked out a collective defense agreement that would have afforded
American protection to Kuwaiti tankers. 87 There were several reasons
why the United States did not do so: (1) the USSR offered to reflag sev-
eral of the Kuwaiti tankers; 881 (2) domestic political opponents objected
to an open-ended commitment to protect friendly shipping;89 and (3) it
was presumed, based on previous experience in the war, that the Iranians
would not attack tankers flying the American flag. 90
Whether the United States chose the most appropriate course in
reflagging the tankers is a question left to time and the historians. Be-
cause the reflagging and escort request was generated by the Kuwaiti
government at its own initiative, the reflagging was at least not a unilat-
eral excuse for a buildup of naval forces in the Gulf. It was, however, an
opportunity to strengthen the link between legal justifications and the
foreign policy need for a presence in the Gulf-an opportunity of which
the Reagan administration took full advantage.
a ship); 46 U.S.C.A. § 12,104 (West Supp. 1987) ("A certificate of documentation is-(1) conclusive
evidence of nationality for international purposes .... ).
86. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 85, at 1065-66 (quoting R. RIENOW, THE TEST
OF THE NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL 104-05 (1937)) (A State may defend the vessels of
another State "so long as [the escort] does not conflict with the control which the State to which the
vessel legally belongs is, under international law, permitted to effect and does, in fact effect.").
87. This is the same idea at work in collective defense arrangements such as the NATO alli-
ance. Countries agree to render mutual assistance if their territory is attacked and can do the same
with respect to vessels. Neither domestic nor international law limits protection to American vessels
only. Indeed, Defense Secretary Weinberger, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, said that the United States, following "practices accepted by all civilized countries," would
come to the aid of ships attacked in the Gulf even if they did not fly the American flag. Healy,
Weinberger Outlines Limits of Policy in GulIW Says US. Will Help Any Vessel UnderAttack but He Is
Ambiguous on Degree of Protection, L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1987, pt. 1, at 4, col. 1. President Reagan
cast the U.S. role as protecting "neutral-nation shipping in international waters." Id. In practice,
however, that has not been the case; the U.S. naval escorts have refused to come to the aid of vessels
not flying the U.S. flag. Iranian Frigate Attacks Greek Tanker in Gulf, Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1987, at
A41, col. 2-3 (U.S. destroyer Chandler took no action in defense of Greek tanker attacked by Irani-
ans "because its rules of engagement prohibit defense of a non-American ship.").
88. See C. Weinberger, supra note 3, at 10.
89. Indeed, several bills proposed to block the reflagging effort until the administration at least
reported its plans for seeking assistance from U.S. allies in protecting the Kuwaiti tankers. See eg.,
H.R. 3039, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (proposing to block reflagging until Kuwait allowed U.S. to base
minesweepers on Kuwaiti territory), reprinted in Hearings Before the Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries on Oversight on the Reflagging of Kuwaiti Tankers and U.S. Naval Escorts for Kuwaiti
Tankers-H.R. 3039, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 343-45 (1987); Hill Demonstrates Its Unease OverPolicy
in the Persian Gulf, 45 CONG. Q. 1169, 1169 (1987) (discussing an appropriations bill amendment to
require a report on U.S. allies' assistance before reflagging could commence). ,
90. See What Are the Targets Iran Likes to Attack, 133 CONG. REc. E2570, E2572 (daily ed.
June 24, 1987) (Rep. Aspin stated that "[t]he Iranians have not . . . ever struck an American
vessel.").
Vol. 1988:174] REFLAGGING
The United States has fit the reflagging under the international stan-
dard of the genuine link. As discussed above, it has done so within the
letter if not within the spirit of the law. The reflagging does not fit within
the spirit of the law because of the basic incongruity arising from assess-
ing a political action against a standard directed to the peculiarities of the
merchant shipping industry. The standard to measure the assertion of
sovereign rights in this case is not that of the genuine link but that of
other, broader principles of international law-those of protecting the
freedom of the seas and of enforcing rights under international
conventions.
III. THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF
If the genuineness of the link between the tankers and the United
States does not provide complete legal support for United States actions
in the Persian Gulf, then other, broader principles of international law
must justify the actions. United States actions in the Persian Gulf ad-
dress intrusions on a crucial international freedom-the freedom of navi-
gation.91 Both Iran and Iraq have impeded that freedom through air
attacks on merchant vessels and by sowing free-floating mines in ship-
ping lanes. The presence of the United States and Allied navies in the
Persian Gulf is a legally justifiable effort to deter illegal actions and assert
customary principles governing the right of vessels to transit the oceans
during peacetime and times of conflict.
91. "This country, throughout its existence has stood for freedom of the seas, a principle whose
breach has precipitated wars among nations." United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 34 (1947).
For a discussion of the development of the principle of the freedom of the seas, see 4 M. WHrrEMAN,
DIGEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 501-02 (1965). One of the more modern examples of protecting
the freedom of the seas by the display or actual use of force is the British protest of the Albanian
attempt to close the Corfu Channel to warships by sending British warships through the channel.
After two of the warships struck mines, the British brought the case before the International Court
of Justice, which decided-based on state practice and conventional law-in favor of the right of
ships and warships to pass innocently through the territorial waters of a state. Corfu Channel (Gr.
Brit. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 36 (Apr. 9, 1949). The North Sea Fisheries cases, adjudicated in the
International Court of Justice between the United Kingdom, Germany, and Iceland in 1973, in-
volved the right of Iceland to claim a twelve-mile territorial sea off its coasts and exclude foreign
fishing vessels from it. The opposing contentions of the parties led to gunfights between fishing
vessels and later to skirmishes between warships when the United Kingdom sent navy ships to ac-
company its fishing vessels within Iceland's twelve-mile limit. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.),
1973 I.CJ. 3 (Feb. 2, 1973). A more recent example of protesting unsubstantiated claims of high
seas occurred between the United States and Libya in the Gulf of Sidra on August 19, 1981, when
the United States sent some of its warships on naval maneuvers across the line that Libya claimed
marked its internal waters. (Colonel Qhadaffi called it the "Line of Death.") See Ratner, The Gulf
of Sidra Incident of 1981: A Study of the Lawfulness of Peacetime Aerial Engagements, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 59, 64-66 (1984) (discussing the legitimacy of U.S. naval maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra).
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A. Freedom of the Seas.
The right the United States seeks to protect in the Persian Gulf is
the well-established right of vessels to transit the seas. Since the seven-
teenth century, when Grotius published his famous treatise on the free-
doms of the seas,92 states have developed and refined customary laws
permitting all vessels to travel the high seas with minimal interference
except from the state whose flag they fly. The customary laws and prac-
tices were finally codified in two conventions on the law of the sea-the
1958 Convention 93 and the 1982 Convention (UNCLOS). 94
The latest, UNCLOS, is the most comprehensive and ambitious,
covering a wide variety of peaceful uses of the seas, including naviga-
tion.95 The absolute right of vessels to transit the seas is now somewhat
limited by claims of coastal states to increasing areas of territory and
authority96 and by the modem needs to maintain environmental and
navigational safety. UNCLOS balances the need for free navigation with
coastal states' rights to protect and control the areas off their shores by
codifying a regime that subjects vessels to only a minimum prescribed set
of regulations as long as vessels are navigating expeditiously through the
seas.
97
The United States and Iran agree on the basic freedoms of naviga-
tion as codified in the 1958 Conventions and UNCLOS. 98 When the con-
voys are moving through the high seas or exclusive economic zones of
92. The treatise was entitled The Freedom of the Seas. See 1 D. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 9-18 (1982).
93. 1958 Convention, supra note 21.
94. UNCLOS, supra note 21.
95. See generally id. art. 2-44 (setting out the framework of the rights and obligations of vessels
and coastal states with respect to, among other issues, navigation through the various zones of the
ocean established in the convention).
96. UNCLOS codified a regime that permitted states to claim up to 200 miles off their coasts as
exclusive economic zones, zones in which the coastal state has sole authority to regulate the eco-
nomic exploitation of the resources. Id arts. 55-58. UNCLOS also permitted coastal states more
control particularly over the environmental conditions of the ships than had previous conventions.
See, eg., id. arts. 218, 220 (giving port states and coastal states, respectively, power to institute
proceedings to enforce international environmental laws against foreign vessels in their waters). For
a discussion of the trend of increasing claims, see Henkin, Politics and the Changing Law of the Sea,
89 POL. Scd. Q. 46, 49-50, 55-60 (1974).
97. See, eg., UNCLOS, supra note 21, arts. 17-19 (prohibiting coastal state interference with a
vessel while it is passing through the state's territorial waters unless the vessel is not moving on an
uniterrupted course).
98. The United States has tacitly agreed to accept the UNCLOS navigational provisions; Iran
explicitly agreed to be bound by them. In a statement on U.S. policy, President Reagan, while
noting that the United States had declined to sign UNCLOS, stated nonetheless
First, the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of
interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans-such as navigation and overflight. In
this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their
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the Persian Gulf they are entitled, as a right, to unimpeded passage.99
The United States and Iran disagree, however, on the nature of the right
of passage through international straits such as the Strait of Hormuz. 1°°
That disagreement is not limited to the United States' and Iran's claims
in the Strait of Hormuz, but extends to a broader general disagreement
coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United
States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states.
Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 378, 379 (1983) [hereinafter EEZ Procla-
mations]; see also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES pt. V, introductory note 55 (Tent. Draft No. 3 1982). The tacit agreement by the United
States, accompanied by consistent practice of abiding by the terms of the Convention, expresses a
clear intention to be bound by, and a duty to try in good faith to comply with, the navigational
provisions. The Iranian government signed UNCLOS, but it has not yet ratified it. See U.N., THE
LAW OF THE SEA: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA at 190, U.N. Sales
No. E.83.V.5 (1983); for the text of the Iranian declaration at the signing, see OFFICE OF THE SPE-
CIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, 5 LAW OF THE
SEA BULLETIN 13-15 (July, 1985) [hereinafter LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN]. The Iranian signature
imports a duty to make good faith efforts, to refrain from misusing its rights or violating the provi-
sions of the Convention prior to ratification. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 909 (H.
Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955). Thus, at least with respect to the navigational provisions of UNCLOS
(omitting the straits passage provisions), the two countries agree that those are the rights to which
vessels and coastal states are entitled to claim.
99. For a discussion of the use of an exclusive economic zone, see supra note 96. High seas are
those areas outside any state's control whose economic exploitation is not subject to appropriation by
any one particular state. Although the two concepts differ with respect to the right to regulate
economic exploitation, they are treated identically with regard to navigational rights. Both areas are
governed by the right of freedom of navigation. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 21, art. 58 (exclu-
sive economic zone right to the freedom of navigation) with hi art. 87 (the high seas right of the
freedom of navigation). Article 90 provides for the right of navigation as follows: "Every State,
whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships under its flag on the high seas." Id art. 90.
100. When Iran signed UNCLOS, it declared that it considered that only states party to the
Convention could benefit from its provisions generally and in particular from the special provisions
concerning unimpeded passage through straits. See LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN, supra note 98, at
14. For states not party to the Convention and as an interim measure until the Convention takes
effect, Iran claims authority to regulate or prohibit passage of vessels if its national security is
threatened. See id. (current position on passage); C. MACDONALD, IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA 102-03, 107 (1980) (historic claims to regulate passage). For general background
on the Iranian position with respect to the law of the sea, see A. EL-HAKIM, THE MIDDLE EASTERN
STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 43-79 (1979).
The United States, on the other hand, considers that all of the navigational provisions of UN-
CLOS reflect customary international law, thereby codifying certain state practices in which all
states are entitled to participate.
First, the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of
interests [in UNCLOS] relating to traditional uses of the oceans-such as navigation and
overflight. In this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other states in the
waters off their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of
the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states.
Second, the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights
in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the convention
[sic].
Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1 PuB. PAPERS 378, 379 (1983). As UNCLOS codifies a
regime of unimpeded passage through straits and the United States supports that position, there is
disagreement over whether Iran can regulate vessel passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
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over whether a customary right of unimpeded passage through straits
exists outside of the conventional right codified in UNCLOS.101 The dis-
agreement may be irrelevant, however, because vessels in the Persian
Gulf can transit the Strait of Hormuz through the channel running
through Oman's territorial waters, where Iran has no legitimate claim to
regulate passage. The Omanis have permitted vessel traffic through their
side of the strait throughout the war and have resisted Iranian incursions
into their waters.10 2
B. Protests Under International Law.
The real disagreement between Iran and the United States is not
over the particulars of the navigational provisions of the law of the sea,
but rather over illegal Iranian military maneuvers to impede rightful pas-
sage. Besides safety restrictions, the freedom of the seas admits of only
one permissive interference--war. 103 Even during wartime, however,
belligerent states are not entitled to impede passage at their discretion. 1o4
Traditional laws of war and modem principles of humanitarian law care-
fully define permissible restrictions on navigation during war.10 5 Mili-
tary maneuvers such as the indiscriminate mining of the Persian Gulf are
illegal under either body of law. 106
States whose interests are threatened by the illegal actions are enti-
tled to protest and seek redress.107 Paper protests are the preferred
101. See, eg., Grunawalt, United States Policy on International Straits, 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L. 445 (1987); Harlow, UNCLOS III and Conflict Management in Straits, 15 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L. 197, 200 (1985); Robertson, Passage Through International Straits: A Right Preserved in the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 801 (1980).
102. Amin, The Regime of International Straits: Legal Implications for The Strait of Hormuz, 12
J. MAR. L. & COMM. 387, 397 (1981).
103. The law of the sea does not address the issue of war; the conventional and customary laws
of naval warfare embody the restrictions that may be imposed on vessels during wartime. For an
extended discussion of the particular provisions of the laws of naval warfare, see Tucker, The Law of
War, in 2 READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE Naval War College Review 1947-1977
233-46 (R. Lillich & J. Moore eds 1980), part of series 61-62 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STUDIES 233-46 (1980).
104. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 175 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952) (discuss-
ing legitimate means of sea warfare).
105. See generally id. at §§ 173-213; Tucker, supra note 103, at 50-143, 196-354.
106. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
107. For a catalog of examples of the various causes of action based on breaches of international
obligations see, 1. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 60-62
(1983) [hereinafter I. BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILrY]. For a discussion of the obligation to
make reparations for damages arising from the illegal use of force, see I. BROWNLIE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 133-49 (1963). See also Note, Limited Armed
Conflict Causing Physical Damage to Neutral Countries" Questions of Liability, 15 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 161, 165-66, 168 (1985) (applying law of international responsibility to Iran-Iraq Armed Con-
flict). In the present case, the Iranian actions of attacking neutral merchant vessels and mining
waters constitute both breaches of customary obligations and violations of various conventions. See,
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method of protest.108 The efficacy of continued paper protests alone,
however, is controversial. On the one hand, paper protests should be
sufficient; states should not be required to take extra measures to enforce
or maintain their rights. On the other hand, the liberal use of paper pro-
tests dilutes their impact so that, without some further move, the right to
protect the claim matures and is lost.109
In the Persian Gulf, where the United States claims to protect the
rule of law and does so in a notorious manner, it is crucial that the
United States abide by the post-United Nations Charter guidelines. State
practice and protests often lead to the development of new norms of cus-
tomary international law.1 10 In order to lead development in a direction
that strengthens, rather than weakens the rule of law, states combatting
illegal practices must themselves take care not to employ illegal practices.
In this post-United Nations Charter period, the protection of claims
through the peaceful settlement of disputes is the norm111 and should be
observed by states during the Iran-Iraq War. The Charter prohibits the
e.g., Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that attacking neutral merchant ship on high seas outside of war exclusion zones without
warning requires restitution); Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 112, (holding that mining waters traveled by commercial vessels without
notification breaches the specific provisions of The Hague Convention No. VIII of 1907 (infra note
119) and the principles of humanitarian law).
108. For examples of typical diplomatic protests, see I. BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 107, at 24-26.
109. 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 95, at 40-42. For the principle that claims may mature if not
acted upon, see Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83, 126-29 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1928) (discussing the failure, over a long period of time, to substantiate territorial claims and its
effect on the right to claim that territory).
110. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 85, at 28-35 (claimants of right include all
actors in world social process); I D. O'CONNELL, supra note 92, at 38-49 (discussing how protests
and treaties may have a far-reaching impact on customary international law); McDougal, The Hy-
drogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 356-57 (1955)
(international law is a process of "continuous interaction"). See generally Gamble, The Treaty!
Custom Dichotomy: An Overview, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 305 (1981) (focusing on the roles of treaty and
custom as sources of international law).
111. J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 300 (1959). Since 1928, when
the Kellog-Briand Pact came into force "for virtually all States in the world," condemning "recourse
to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounc[ing] it as an instrument of na-
tional policy in their relations with one another," traditional war has been an unrecognized and
violative concept under international law. Treaty Renouncing War as an Instrument of National
Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, art. I, 46 Stat. 2343, 2345-46, T.S. No. 796, at 3-4, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, at 63 (also
known as the Kellog-Briand Pact and the Pact of Paris). The United Nations Charter confirms that
policy, providing that, "[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHAR-
TER, art. 2(3). Compare 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 108, at 177-78 (noting the legality of recourse
to war prior to the Kellog-Briand Pact) with Schindler, State of War, Belligerency, Armed Conflict,
in THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLIcT 3, 5 (A. Cassese ed. 1979) (discussing the
negligible impact of the Kellog-Briand Pact and subsequent agreements in limiting hostilities).
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aggressive use of force and resort to war as methods of protecting a legiti-
mate claim. 1 2 The Charter allows force only when used in self-defense.
Self-defensive force is limited to carefully circumscribed situations' 3-if
there is any force used at all, even in protesting the most flagrant viola-
tions, the employment of force must be defensive, rather than offensive.
Despite the difficulty of relying on paper protests, states are obliged to, 11 4
and must work towards, compliance with Charter principles if the princi-
ples are to continue guiding state actions in response to aggressive and
illegal uses of force.
In responding to the mining activities, the United States has at-
tempted to comply with United Nations Charter guidelines. When paper
protests and United Nations Security Council Resolutions1 5 failed, the
United States and its Allies moved to more visible and active forms of
protest-reflagging the Kuwaiti tankers and sweeping the Gulf to rid it
of mines. The interdiction of the Iranian minelayer is the only forceful
measure the United States or the Allies have taken in response to the
extensive mining of Persian Gulf waters because it is the only instance in
which clear-cut evidence of immediately threatening illegal activities jus-
tified the use of force in self-defense.
112. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter provides that:
[aill Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4).
113. Article 2(4) is considered to prohibit any use of force except in the limited circumstance
when it is necessary for self-defense as provided in Article 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Id. art. 51. States have also justified the use of force by claiming that the government under attack
requested that the state intervene. For example, the United States justified the use of force in invad-
ing Grenada partly on the claim that the Governor-General of Grenada requested U.S. assistance.
See Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM.
J. INT'L L. 131, 137 (1984) (noting that this claim was a "prominent legal justification for the Gre-
nada action"); Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
113, 118 (1986) (noting that this jusitification was one of three made by the State Department). See
generally Brownlie, The United Nations Charter and the Use of Force, 1945-1985, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 500-02 (A. Cassese ed. 1986) (tracing U.S. "interven-
tion by request" since 1945).
114. Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which includes the duties to settle disputes
through peaceful measures and to refrain from the use of force, opens with the statement: "The
Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance
with the following Principles." U.N. CHARTER art. 2 (emphasis added).
115. See supra note 12.
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C. The Mining of Persian Gulf Waters.
Mines-laid indiscriminately throughout the Gulf-have been one
of the most serious impediments to safe vessel navigation during the
Iran-Iraq War. Mining is restricted by both international war conven-
tions and modem principles of humanitarian law. 1 6 Both bodies of law
prohibit sowing free-floating, activated mines of the type deployed by the
Iranians. 117 Efforts to halt the illegal mining activity are limited, how-
ever, by the principles prohibiting the use of force except in those situa-
tions of necessary self-defense." 8 As a result, the United States and its
allies have relied on minesweeping to frustrate the illegal activities. Only
when the United States had absolute proof of illegal mining activities by
the Iranians did it move to protect its vessels in self-defense.' 19 The com-
bination of minesweeping and forceful actions, when necessary, serves
notice that illegal activities will not be tolerated or accepted as part of
state practice.
1. International Law on Mining. The laws governing mining de-
rive from several different sources, including the 1907 Hague Convention
No. VIII,120 customary principles, 12' the Corfu Channel case 22 and the
116. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
117. Id
118. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
119. The international law test governing the judgment of the propriety of the use of force in
self-defense, like the municipal common law test, comprises both objective and subjective standards.
Zedalis, Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved Questions Involving the Law of Anticipatory Self-
Defense, 19 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 129, 150-51 (1987) ("the required state of mind has both a
subjective as well as an objective component"). Import of the objective, "reasonable man" standard
to international evaluation is necessary to effect the policy of the justiciability of self-defense, that is,
that no nation may be the final judge of its own actions. Schachter, Self-Judging Self-Defense, 19
CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 121, 123-27 (1987) (discussing the necessity for justiciability of states'
claims of self-defense). United States troops gathered evidence of the illegal activities. This evidence
should satisfy the objective proof requirement.
120. Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague No.
VIII), opened for signature Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541, 205 Parry's T.S. 331 [hereinaf-
ter 1907 Convention]. The United States signed this convention and later ratified it on November
27, 1909. See infra note 127. For a general discussion of the legal aspects of mining, see D.
O'CONNELL, supra note 92, at 1138-39; Tucker, supra note 103, at 303-05; Thorpe, Mine Warfare at
Sea--Some Legal Aspects of the Future, 18 OCEAN DE. & INT'L L. 255 (1987). For an American
interpretation of the convention notice requirements, see 10 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 91, at 679-
80 (commentary by legal advisor to Undersecretary of State Welles).
121. In addition to the 1907 Convention, there are several generally accepted customary duties
that further limit mining: First, the mines may be laid only in the theater of operation, and the
belligerent must provide or mark out safe routes through which merchant vessels may pass without
undue hardship or inconvenience. Tucker, supra note 103, at 305. Second, "[tihe fields must be
justifiable as a genuine measure of self-defense." Thorpe, supra note 120, at 272-73. Third,
minefields may be employed only when they discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate objects
of war. 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 417-18 (1968).
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recent pronouncement in the International Court of Justice concerning
the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors by the United States. 123 Not one
of these sources prohibits use of all mines. None, however, permits use
of the type of activated, free-floating mines employed by Iran. The inex-
pensive effectiveness of mines in deterring enemy and neutral shipping
has presented great difficulties in obtaining universal acquiescence to a
complete prohibition.1 24 The trend of official decisions, state practice
and the development of humanitarian principles, however, have re-
stricted their use as an instrument of naval warfare.
a. The 1907 Hague Convention No. VII. The 1907 Hague Con-
vention No. VIII is the only convention governing mining. The terms of
the Convention are relevant because Iran's predecessor, Persia, signed
the 1907 Hague Convention but never ratified it.125 By virtue of its sig-
nature, and until it renounces the Convention-which it has not done-
Iran is under an obligation to comply with at least the spirit of the Con-
vention.1 26 The United States signed and ratified the Convention and is
thus bound by its terms. 127 In addition, this Convention, like the other
1907 Hague Conventions on the laws of war, is generally considered a
statement of the customary rules, defining legal mining actions for all
states.128
122. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Elementary considerations of humanity
and freedom of maritime communication confine the right to mine.).
123. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14.
124. The 1907 Hague Convention conferees recognized, even then, the near impossibility of se-
curing agreement on strict limitations on the use of so inexpensive and effective a weapon as the
mine:
Seeing that, although the existing position of affairs makes it impossible to forbid the em-
ployment of automatic submarine contact mines, it is nevertheless desirable to restrict and
regulate their employment in order to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure, as far as
possible, to peaceful navigation the sweurity to which it is entitled, despite the existence of
war.
1907 Convention, supra note 120, 36 Stat. at 2333-34, T.S. No. 541, at 5, 205 Parry's T.S. at 333.
The impossibility posed by the "existing position of affairs" has never changed sufficiently to
update the convention. Subsequent efforts to impose further restriction through a new mining con-
vention have failed. Levie, Mine Warfare and International Law, 62 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
INTERNATIONAL L. STUDIEs 271, 275-76 (1980).
125. Persia signed the convention on October 18, 1907. 1907 Convention, supra note 120, 36
Stat. at 2349, T.S. No. 541 at 22, 205 Parry's T.S. at 342.
126. This obligation is known as pacta sunt servanda, that is, agreements of the parties must be
observed.
127. The United States signed the convention on October 18, 1907 and ratified it on November
27, 1909. 1907 Convention, supra note 120, 36 Stat. at 2347, 2350, T.S. No. 541, at 20, 23, 205
Parry's T.S. at 340, 343; D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 720
(1981).
128. See, ag., DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATION (NWP 9) § 9.2 (1987).
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The 1907 Convention neither entirely forbids the use of mines nor
proscribes where they may be used. It does, however, forbid use of the
type of unanchored, long-term activated mines employed by Iran (and
perhaps Iraq) in the Persian Gulf.129 Unanchored mines are lawfully
deployed only if they become inactive within an hour of deployment; 130
unanchored Iranian mines probably remain active for days if not weeks.
The 1907 Convention's failure to limit either the use of mines altogether
or areas of the sea where mines can be lawfully deployed renders it some-
what ineffective. The wholesale mining of the seas during the two World
Wars demonstrated that the 1907 Convention, standing alone, was not
sufficient to protect peaceful merchant shipping. More restrictive pre-
scriptions have consequently grown out of customary practices, as well
as the International Court of Justice's opinions in the Corfu Channel de-
cision131 and the Nicaragua decision. 32
b. The Nicaragua decision. It is ironic that the most current
opinion from the International Court of Justice on the continued viability
and propriety of using mines as a means of conducting hostilities involves
a judgment against the United States for the mining of Nicaraguan
harbors. 133 The Court emphasized that principles more basic than the
sparse details of the 1907 Convention governing mining-those of the
freedom of navigation and modern, humanitarian law. 134 The laying of
129. Article I of the convention forbids the use of both unanchored contact mines unless they
can be rendered harmless one hour after being laid and anchored contact mines unless they become
harmless as soon as they break free of their moorings. 1907 Convention, supra note 120, art. 1, (1) &
(2), 36 Stat. at 2343, T.S. No. 541, at 15. Article 2 provides that "lilt is forbidden to lay automatic
contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial
shipping." Id. art. 2, 36 Stat. at 2343, T.S. No. 541, at 15. Article 3 requires states to take "every
possible precaution" for the security of peaceful shipping when using anchored automatic contact
mines. Id. art. 3, 36 Stat. at 2343, T.S. No. 541, at 15-16. Belligerents are required to "undertake to
do their utmost to render these mines harmless within a limited time, and should they cease to be
under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies permit." Id., 36 Stat. at
2343, T.S. No. 541, at 15-16. Article 4 permits neutrals to mine their own coasts subject to the
requirements, including that of notice, of the previous articles. Id. art. 4, 36 Stat. at 2343-44, T.S.
No. 541, at 15-16.
130. Id. art. 1, 36 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 541, at 15.
131. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4, 22 ("The obligations incumbent upon the
Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a
minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the
imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them." The court went on to note that the duty of
notification emanates, not from the 1907 Convention, but from "elementary considerations of hu-
manity .... the principle of the freedom of maritime communication [,] and every State's obligation
not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.").
132. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14.
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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mines by one state in the ports or territorial waters of another interferes
with the sovereignty of the coastal state and the "right of free access
enjoyed by foreign ships." 135 Laying mines on the high seas interferes
with the customary freedoms of communications and maritime com-
merce belonging to all vessels on the high seas. Laying mines in any
waters without notification is a breach of international law:
It has already been made clear above that in peacetime for one State to
lay mines in the internal or territorial waters of another is an unlawful
act; but in addition, if a State lays mines in any waters whatever in
which the vessels of another State have rights of access or passage, and
fails to give any warning or notification whatsoever, in disregard of the
security of peaceful shipping, it commits a breach of the principles of
humanitarian law underlying the specific provisions of Convention No.
VIII of 1907. Those principles were expressed by the Court in the
Corfu Channel case as follows: "certain general and well recognized
principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more
exacting in peace than in war."'136
The Court specifically reemphasized the customary requirement of notifi-
cation that exists in addition to and regardless of a state's accession to the
1907 Convention. Thus, Iran's, and possibly Iraq's, mining activities and
subsequent failure to notify mariners of its mining activities placed Iran,
and possibly Iraq, 137 in violation of the principles embodied in the Inter-
national Court of Justice's latest opinion on the status of mining.
2. The Iranian Minelaying Incident of September 22, 198Z On
September 22, 1987, United States special forces located, photographed,
then attacked an Iranian vessel unloading mines into an international
shipping lane. The United States claimed that
[t]he actions taken by U.S. forces were conducted in the exercise of our
right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
Mining of the high seas, without notice and in an area of restricted
navigation, is unlawful and a serious threat to world public order and
the safety of international maritime commerce. These Iranian actions
were taken despite warnings given to the Government of Iran, subse-
135. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 112.
136. Id.
137. The degree of Iranian responsibility for all mining in the Gulf is a question of fact that will
have to be determined if claims for reparations to vessels are ever presented-as they should be. The
presentation of claims provides an opportunity to establish the facts, restate or develop the law,
determine the guilty party and force the guilty party, through peaceful methods, to make reparations
for its illegal conduct. Until the facts are definitely established or admitted, the known facts-that
the Iranians were caught laying mines that match many of those swept from the Gulf, that most of
the mines have been discovered on the western side of the Gulf, i.e., not in Iranian waters or Iranian
shipping lanes, and that the appearance of the mines in the Gulf is consistent with the Iranian policy
of deterring shipping to and from Iraq or its allies-implicate the Iranians as responsible for at least
some of the damage.
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quent to the recent mine damage done to the U.S.-flag vessel
Bridgeton, that the U.S. Government would take the action necessary
to defend U.S. vessels from attacks of this nature.1 38
Whether the United States' claim is justified depends on the require-
ments of self-defense under article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
The exercise of self-defense is limited by three requirements: (1) that it is
a response to a prior armed attack, (2) that it is proportional to the force
sought to be repelled, and (3) that it is necessary.1 39
a. Responding to a prior armed attack The first requirement
raises two issues: whether minelaying activities can be considered an
armed attack and, if so, whether the activities occurred prior in time to
the American interception. As one scholar has noted, neither the legisla-
tive history nor the language of article 51 itself explains precisely what
constitutes an armed attack. 14 General scholarly opinion considers at a
minimum that an armed attack must involve the "illegal use of physical
force by the armed forces of the state." 141
Thus, an armed attack has three constituent components: (1) ille-
gal, (2) use of force, (3) by armed forces of the state. As discussed in the
previous section, the Iranian mining campaign was conducted in an un-
lawful manner-the mines were of a type prohibited by international
convention and practices, and mariners were not notified of the location
of the fields.142 A mine, like other conventional weapons used in armed
attacks, achieves its destructive end through the use of force. The end
result for a vessel' 43 that has struck a mine is the same as if it suffered
from another frequent Iranian tactic-missile attack. In either case, the
explosion of the device severely damages both vessel and personnel.44
138. United States Air Strike in the Persian Gulf, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1066 (Sept.
28, 1987).
139. See supra note 113.
140. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 278-79 (1963).
141. Badr, The Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defense in State Responsibility, 10 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 15 (1980) (footnote omitted).
142. See supra text accompanying note 137.
143. Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 291, 291
(1985) (A state is justified in resorting to the unilateral use of force "[w]hen it has been subjected to
an armed attack on its territory, vessels or military forces." (emphasis added)).
144. Mines and mining fit within the category of weapons the United Nations has classified as
capable of being used in an aggressive, and therefore, illegal, manner. Aggression includes: "(b)
Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any
weapons by a State against the territory of another State." Definition of Aggression Resolution,
G.A. Res. 3314, art. 3(b), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
The report accompanying the resolution noted that within article 3(b), "'any weapons' is used with-
out making a distinction between conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction and any other
kind of weapon." Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 9, U.N. Doe. A/9619 & Corr. 1 (1974).
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Finally, although it is unclear whether the sailors on the minelayer were
part of the Iranian armed forces, the attack falls into a pattern of other
Iranian-sponsored attacks as part of its war effort. 145 Thus, the minelay-
ing is properly characterized as an armed attack.
Justification for considering the minelaying incident as a prior at-
tack is found in the recent history of mining in the Persian Gulf. The
Iranian armed attack included not just the mines unloaded in the Gulf
that evening but all the prior damage caused by previous illegal mining
activities. Prior attacks caused damage to the U.S.-flagged vessels
Bridgeton and Texaco Carribean, as well as to many other neutral states'
vessels. 146 The continuing illegal mining activities by the Iranians conse-
quently provided continuing opportunities to respond in self-defense. 147
The armed attack, in other words, commenced when the Iranians pushed
the first mines into the Gulf.
Reponse to that action was not appropriate, however, until all re-
quirements of the self-defense formula were present-the need for imme-
diate action to protect against further illegal uses of force. Some might
argue that the dispersed mines "attacked" nothing; therefore, the inter-
ception was responding to an expectation rather than an actual use of
force and was an unjustified, aggressive use of force.148 This argument
145. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REc. E2465, E2465-66 (daily ed. June 17, 1987) (statement of Rep.
Aspin) (describing the types of attacks Iran has used during the Gulf war, particularly noting the
Pasdaran attacks from naval launches).
146. Caught in the Act, supra note 8, at 22,
147. The proper timeframe for considering a forceful response to a forceful attack as an action
taken in self-defense is a controversial issue, particularly where there is an isolated atiack, unlike the
situation in the Persian Gulf. There has been considerable discussion on the permissive boundaries
of response-time, but mostly with respect to the issue of whether a state anticipating an attack may
act before the attack occurs, see infra note 148. Far less discussion has focused on the difficulties in
limiting the after-attack response time. But cf Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the
Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 113, 132 (1986) ("mhe idea of self-defense contains a temporal
element. It refers to a response made close in time to an attack or imminent threat.... The difficulty
of defining a precise time limit-a statute of limitations, as it were-does not impugn the basic
idea."); Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad, 8 WHrr-
TIER L. REV. 711, 729-32 (discussing the timing element with respect to the United States bombing
of Libya in April 1986). It seems clear, however, that when a state launches a series of attacks, the
victim, within the bounds of self-defense, is entitled to respond to any and all attacks to protect itself
for as long as the attacks continue.
148. The scope of the right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter is itself subject to divisive
debate. Some authors argue that the interplay between articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations
Charter permits an interpretation that would allow states to respond in self-defense in anticipation of
an armed attack (the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense). See, ,'g., McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban
Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 599-600 (1963). Other authors argue that the
Charter restricted the traditional right of self-defense only to those situations where an armed attack
has occurred. See, ag., L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141 (2d ed. 1979). The author of this
note believes the U.S. action in responding to the minelaying incident fits within the latter category
and therefore does not require further discussion of competing interpretations.
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ignores the on going realities of the Persian Gulf situation. The match
between the mines recovered from the deck of the Iranian vessel and
those previously swept from the Gulf provide a clear link to Iran for at
least a portion of the damage previously done to merchant vessels in the
Gulf.149 Given the large number of previously undisclosed mines in the
Gulf, it is not improbable that those deployed from the Iranian minelayer
would lie hidden as well until triggered by a passing vessel, causing fur-
ther damage.
b. The proportionate use of repelling force. The second element of
the self-defense test requires that the repelling force be proportional-
sufficient to deter or halt the illegal event but not so much as to purposely
inflict damage on the offending party.150 The United States response was
proportional. Attacking one vessel in return for the many damaged by
undisclosed mines cannot be considered excessive.
c. The necessity of the repelling force. The traditional and endur-
ing formulation of the third element, "necessity," requires that the need
to use force, "is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation." 15' The situation demonstrated that
forceful actions were necessary, that evening, to terminate the illegal
sowing of mines in the shipping lanes of the Gulf. United States troops
had to fire on the Iranian minelayer two separate times to halt the sowing
activities.1 52 The continuation of the sowing operation after the first at-
tack made it clear that a warning to halt the activities was not sufficient.
Had the mines been deployed, locating and destroying all of them would
have been difficult if not impossible.
*. *. * * *
Reponses through the use of force in self-defense when necessary to
deter illegal mining activities demonstrate to states such as Iran that the
disturbances of world order are not without a price. The cumulative ef-
fect of the convoy activities is to serve notice to Iran and Iraq that the
United States and the Allies will continue to require the belligerents to
take account of customary and conventional international norms. Iran
openly disregarded the standards of the world community and failed to
observe the basic obligations coincident with the act of mining. The
combination of keeping the seas open despite intimidating and sometimes
deadly overtures from both Persian Gulf belligerents, sweeping the area
149. Caught in the Act. supra note 8, at 22.
150. D. BowETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (1958).
151. The Caroline, 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 412 (1906).
152. Caught in The Act, supra note 8, at 22.
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to rid it of mines, and responding when necessary in self-defense sets an
important precedent in dealing with difficult and protracted conflicts that
can have a substantial impact on the world economy.
CONCLUSION
The reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers as a flagging event was a law-
ful undertaking. The administration was careful to comply with or seek
waivers for all documentation requirements. The tenuousness of the link
between the tankers and the United States may give rise to skepticism
over the degree to which states may abuse the genuine link concept, but
such skepticism does not give any state the right to deny the United
States nationality of the tankers. The right to give a vessel a flag is a
sovereign right that cannot now or in the foreseeable future be ques-
tioned once a state has decided to proceed with flagging.
The United States used the strength of that conclusion to achieve
certain foreign policy goals in the Persian Gulf. Although politics may
have dominated the decision to take on the Kuwaiti tankers, the reflag-
ging also served to reinforce the rights of the freedom of the seas and the
right of merchant vessels to trade even during times of conflict. There
was a particular need for an obvious assertion of neutral rights in the
Persian Gulf where one, if not both, of the participants has demonstrated
a ready willingness to disregard accepted international norms and ignore
paper protests.
Because the United States' presence in the Gulf is so highly visible,
is premised on basic international rights, and was mobilized for the pur-
pose of defending those rights, the United States should take care to as-
sure itself and the world community that its actions within the Gulf fall
within accepted and justifiable international practices. Resort to the un-
lawful use of force would render the United States' actions just as illegal
as those of Iran, deteriorate the rule of law, and set dangerous prece-
dents. In keeping with the spirit of the post-United Nations era, the
United States should continue to refrain from retaliatory moves and
press for a peaceful settlement of the Persian Gulf war and the claims
emanating from the conflict.
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